Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies

DOI10.2307/2938266zbMath0734.90004MaRDI QIDQ3362063

Thomas R. Palfrey, Sanjay Srivastava

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145552688

zbMATH Keywords

implementation; weakly dominated strategy; undominated Nash equilibrium; no veto power condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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