Braess paradox and properties of Wardrop equilibrium in some multiservice networks

zbMATH Open1105.90307MaRDI QIDQ3374291FDOQ3374291

Authors: Rachid El-Azouzi, Odile Pourtallier, Eitan Altman 

Publication date: 9 March 2006

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zbMATH Keywords

networksNash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Noncooperative games (91A10) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20)

Cited In (6)

• Coincident cost improvement vs. Degradation by adding connections to noncooperative networks and distributed systems
• Braess' paradox: A cooperative game‐theoretic point of view
• Avoiding paradoxes in multi-agent competitive routing.
• Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
• Paradoxes in a multi-criteria routing game
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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