Braess paradox and properties of Wardrop equilibrium in some multiservice networks

MaRDI QIDQ3374291zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Rachid El-Azouzi, Odile Pourtallier, Eitan Altman

Publication date 9 March 2006

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumnetworks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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