Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices

DOI10.1287/opre.1070.0431zbMath1167.91357MaRDI QIDQ3392116

Publication date: 13 August 2009

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0431

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Mechanism Design and Auctions for Electricity Networks, Decision Rule Bounds for Two-Stage Stochastic Bilevel Programs, Computing Feasible Points of Bilevel Problems with a Penalty Alternating Direction Method, Genericity Analysis of Multi-Leader-Disjoint-Followers Game, On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games, A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games, Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography, Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response, Extensions of Nash Games in Finite and Infinite Dimensions with Applications, Technical Note—There’s No Free Lunch: On the Hardness of Choosing a Correct Big-M in Bilevel Optimization, A Practical Scheme to Compute the Pessimistic Bilevel Optimization Problem, Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market: Part 1 – existence and characterization, Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market Part 2 - best response of a producer, On engineering game theory with its application in power systems, Generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Two-stage stochastic equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints: modeling and numerical schemes, Value at risk approach to producer's best response in an electricity market with uncertain demand, Strategic investment decisions in an oligopoly with a competitive fringe: an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints approach, Regularized Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints with Application to Energy Markets, An approximation scheme for a class of risk-averse stochastic equilibrium problems, National-strategic investment in European power transmission capacity, Feasibility problems with complementarity constraints, Transmission and generation investment in electricity markets: the effects of market splitting and network fee regimes, Relaxation approach for equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints, Bilevel direct search method for leader-follower problems and application in health insurance, Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints, Open versus closed loop capacity equilibria in electricity markets under perfect and oligopolistic competition, A variational inequality method for computing a normalized equilibrium in the generalized Nash game, Smoothing approach to Nash equilibrium formulations for a class of equilibrium problems with shared complementarity constraints, Constraints handling in Nash/adjoint optimization methods for multi-objective aerodynamic design, A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games, Three modeling paradigms in mathematical programming, Variational inequality formulation of a class of multi-leader-follower games, A closed-loop supply chain equilibrium model with random and price-sensitive demand and return, Network expansion to mitigate market power, Divide to conquer: decomposition methods for energy optimization, Uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria on DC power flow networks, Bilevel programming for price-based electricity auctions: a revenue-constrained case, On \(M\)-stationary points for a stochastic equilibrium problem under equilibrium constraints in electricity spot market modeling., Monopolistic competition in electricity networks with resistance losses, Nonconvex equilibrium models for gas market analysis: failure of standard techniques and alternative modeling approaches, On supply-function equilibria in radial transmission networks, On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity, The backpropagation artificial neural network based on elite particle swam optimization algorithm for stochastic linear bilevel programming problem, Generation flexibility in ramp rates: strategic behavior and lessons for electricity market design, Uniqueness of market equilibrium on a network: a peak-load pricing approach, An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem, An MPEC reformulation of an EPEC model for electricity markets, Closing the gap in linear bilevel optimization: a new valid primal-dual inequality, Outer approximation for global optimization of mixed-integer quadratic bilevel problems, A robust approach for modeling limited observability in bilevel optimization, A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction, The spot and balancing markets for electricity: open- and closed-loop equilibrium models, Optimal storage and transmission investments in a bilevel electricity market model, The value of cooperation in interregional transmission planning: a noncooperative equilibrium model approach, A smoothing method for a class of generalized Nash equilibrium problems, On electricity market equilibria with storage: modeling, uniqueness, and a distributed ADMM, A two stage stochastic equilibrium model for electricity markets with two way contracts, Stochastic Nash equilibrium problems: sample average approximation and applications, A new method for solving multiobjective bilevel programs, Basic theoretical foundations and insights on bilevel models and their applications to power systems, Multiscale control of Stackelberg games, On the computation of equilibria in monotone and potential stochastic hierarchical games, Deregulated electricity markets with thermal losses and production bounds: models and optimality conditions, Addressing supply-side risk in uncertain power markets: stochastic Nash models, scalable algorithms and error analysis, Mixed integer parametric bilevel programming for optimal strategic bidding of energy producers in day-ahead electricity markets with indivisibilities, Analysis of M-stationary points to an EPEC modeling oligopolistic competition in an electricity spot market

Uses Software