The airport problem with capacity constraints

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0191-3MaRDI QIDQ339922zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Youngsub Chun, Boram Park

Publication date 11 November 2016

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0191-3

zbMATH Keywords

airport problems with capacity constraintsaxiomatic characterizationsequential equal contributions ruleShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem
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Cites work

• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
• Some non-superadditive games, and their Shapley values, in the talmud
• The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited

Cited in

(14)

• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
• Increasing airport capacity utilisation through optimum slot scheduling: review of current developments and identification of future needs
• The over-constrained airport gate assignment problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4152104 (Why is no real title available?)
• Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
• A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems
• Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem
• Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems
• Revenue sharing in airline alliance networks
• Fair ride allocation on a line
• Cost allocation and airport problems
• A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules
• On the waiting time of arriving aircrafts and the capacity of airports with one or two runways

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