Beyond Plurality: Truth-Bias in Binary Scoring Rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_27zbMath1405.91159OpenAlexW2294640444MaRDI QIDQ3449549

Omer Lev, Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Evangelos Markakis, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_27

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriavoting mechanisms\(k\)-approval rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)

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