Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0930-7zbMath1367.91063OpenAlexW2149214642MaRDI QIDQ345198

Jerry S. Kelly, Fasil Alemante, Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 1 December 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0930-7

zbMATH Keywords

maximinmonotonicityneutralityanonymityapproval votingCondorcetlower invarianceplurality votingresolute domainsocial choice correspondencesocial choice functionupper invariance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

A stability property in social choice theory ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Balancedness of social choice correspondences

Cites Work

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