A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt

DOI10.2307/2298021zbMath0697.90004MaRDI QIDQ3475091

Guido Tabellini, Alberto Alesina

Publication date: 1990

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298021

zbMATH Keywords

elections; public goods; equilibrium level of debt; Government debt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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