The punishment mechanism analysis of Cartel Alliance mechanism

zbMATH Open1146.91306MaRDI QIDQ3517020FDOQ3517020

Authors: Ming Jin, Sheng Zhu 

Publication date: 12 August 2008

Recommendations

• The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements
• Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795166
• When imperfect collution is profitable

zbMATH Keywords

game equilibriumpunishment mechanismcartel alliancecoumot model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

This page was built for publication: The punishment mechanism analysis of Cartel Alliance mechanism

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3517020)