Seifert’s RSA Fault Attack: Simplified Analysis and Generalizations
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Publication:3535345
DOI10.1007/11935308_30zbMATH Open1309.94157OpenAlexW2145132148MaRDI QIDQ3535345FDOQ3535345
Authors: James A. Muir
Publication date: 11 November 2008
Published in: Information and Communications Security (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/11935308_30
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Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)
Cited In (11)
- Structure-based RSA fault attacks
- Fault Attacks on RSA Signatures with Partially Unknown Messages
- Fault Attacks on RSA Public Keys: Left-To-Right Implementations Are Also Vulnerable
- Simplification of the Lattice Based Attack of Boneh and Durfee for RSA Cryptoanalysis
- Errors Matter: Breaking RSA-Based PIN Encryption with Thirty Ciphertext Validity Queries
- PSS is secure against random fault attacks
- On the multiple fault attacks on RSA signatures with LSBs of messages unknown
- Attacking RSA-CRT signatures with faults on Montgomery multiplication
- Fault analysis of the NTRUSign digital signature scheme
- Fault attacks against EMV signatures
- Fault Attacks on Public Key Elements: Application to DLP-Based Schemes
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