Weakened notions of equilibria and optimality in conflict problems

DOI10.1134/S0012266113030117zbMATH Open1269.91013OpenAlexW1991924678MaRDI QIDQ354514FDOQ354514

È. R. Smol'yakov

Publication date: 19 July 2013

Published in: Differential Equations (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0012266113030117

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalityconflict stabilitySlater optimalityweak equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multiobjective variational problems, Pareto optimality, applications to economics, etc. (58E17)

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• Non-cooperative games
• Improvement on ``quantum key agreement protocol with maximally entangled states
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Cited In (2)

• New notions of conflict equilibria and differential games
• When a- and d-oftimality conflict

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