Weakened notions of equilibria and optimality in conflict problems
DOI10.1134/S0012266113030117zbMATH Open1269.91013OpenAlexW1991924678MaRDI QIDQ354514FDOQ354514
Authors: È. R. Smol'yakov 
Publication date: 19 July 2013
Published in: Differential Equations (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0012266113030117
Recommendations
Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multiobjective variational problems, Pareto optimality, applications to economics, etc. (58E17)
Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Improvement on ``quantum key agreement protocol with maximally entangled states
- Useful equilibria for game theory
- Strongest equilibria for conflict problems and differential games
- Weak equilibria in differential games with partially intersecting interests of participants
Cited In (8)
- Auxiliary strong equilibria for dynamic conflict problems
- Conflict individual-Pareto equilibria
- New notions of conflict equilibria and differential games
- A complicated notion of equilibrium for conflict problems
- When a- and d-oftimality conflict
- Minimality of a solution update in conflict resolution: An application of revision programming to the von Neumann-Morgenstern approach
- Strengthened equilibria for conflict problems
- Conflict stable Pareto optimal equilibria
This page was built for publication: Weakened notions of equilibria and optimality in conflict problems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q354514)
