From Pigou to extended liability: on the optimal taxation of externalities under imperfect financial markets

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00585.XzbMATH Open1231.91351OpenAlexW2148947106MaRDI QIDQ3563641FDOQ3563641

Jean Tirole

Publication date: 1 June 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00585.x

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cited In (5)

• Extended liability for environmental accidents: what you see is what you get
• The economics of data externalities
• Externalities, Pigouvian corrections, and risk attitudes
• Optimal extended liability rule in a competitive financial market with heterogeneous borrower firms
• Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures

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