Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols: a taster
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3569110
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_18zbMATH Open1284.68243OpenAlexW2142976113MaRDI QIDQ3569110FDOQ3569110
Authors: Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, M. D. Ryan 
Publication date: 17 June 2010
Published in: Towards Trustworthy Elections (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_18
Recommendations
Cited In (19)
- Decidability of equivalence of symbolic derivations
- Trace equivalence and epistemic logic to express security properties
- Computing Knowledge in Security Protocols under Convergent Equational Theories
- YAPA: A Generic Tool for Computing Intruder Knowledge
- Computing knowledge in security protocols under convergent equational theories
- On Communication Models When Verifying Equivalence Properties
- One vote is enough for analysing privacy
- Efficiently deciding equivalence for standard primitives and phases
- Programming Languages and Systems
- When are three voters enough for privacy properties?
- Modular verification of protocol equivalence in the presence of randomness
- POR for security protocol equivalences. Beyond action-determinism
- To know or not to know: Epistemic approaches to security protocol verification
- Static validation of a voting protocol
- On compositional reasoning about anonymity and privacy in epistemic logic
- Beyond Subterm-Convergent Equational Theories in Automated Verification of Stateful Protocols
- Deciding knowledge in security protocols under some e-voting theories
- Relations between privacy, verifiability, accountability and coercion-resistance in voting protocols
- Formalizing and proving privacy properties of voting protocols using alpha-beta privacy
This page was built for publication: Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols: a taster
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3569110)
