Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users

DOI10.1145/780542.780618zbMath1192.68032MaRDI QIDQ3581254

Tim Roughgarden, Richard John Cole, Yevgeniy Dodis

Publication date: 16 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/780542.780618

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68M10: Network design and communication in computer systems

91A43: Games involving graphs

Related Items

Dynamic Coordination of Multiple Agents in a Class of Differential Games Through a Generalized Linear Reward Scheme, Pricing bridges to cross a river, Bertrand Competition in Networks, A generalized two-agent location problem: Asymmetric dynamics and coordination, Existence and computation of optimal tolls in multiclass network equilibrium problems, Coordination mechanisms, Transfer implementation in congestion games, Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish users with elastic demands, Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks, A network pricing game for selfish traffic, Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms, Demand allocation with latency cost functions, The toll effect on price of anarchy when costs are nonlinear and asymmetric, How much can taxes help selfish routing?, On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard, Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria, Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks, Stackelberg network pricing is hard to approximate, On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users, Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes