Self-reference and the Languages of Arithmetic

DOI10.1093/philmat/nkl028zbMath1132.03002OpenAlexW2064302725MaRDI QIDQ3592241

Richard G. jun. Heck

Publication date: 12 September 2007

Published in: Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/37f76c45eac660ef846087e142904de0ce94490d

zbMATH Keywords

truthself-referenceGödel numberingdiagonalization lemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40)

Related Items (12)

SELF-REFERENCE UPFRONT: A STUDY OF SELF-REFERENTIAL GÖDEL NUMBERINGS ⋮ GÖDEL’S THEOREM AND DIRECT SELF-REFERENCE ⋮ Truth meets vagueness. Unifying the semantic and the soritical paradoxes ⋮ A step towards absolute versions of metamathematical results ⋮ Bicontextualism ⋮ Varieties of self-reference in metamathematics ⋮ The liar paradox and ``meaningless revenge ⋮ What’s so Special About the Gödel Sentence $$\mathcal {G}$$ ? ⋮ REFERENCE IN ARITHMETIC ⋮ Faithfulness for naive validity ⋮ Alethic reference ⋮ Non-reflexivity and revenge

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