The Promotion and Evolution of Cooperation Through Projection: Implications for Social Dilemmas and Trust

DOI10.1080/00222500601188502zbMATH Open1275.91111OpenAlexW2080274601WikidataQ126268096 ScholiaQ126268096MaRDI QIDQ3593587FDOQ3593587

Authors: Yusuke Kanazawa 

Publication date: 23 July 2007

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00222500601188502

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zbMATH Keywords

trustprojectioncooperationagent-based simulationsocial dilemmasprisoner's dilemma game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Psychophysics and psychophysiology; perception (91E30)

Cites Work

• Trust, assurance, and inequality: A rational choice model of mutual trust 1

Cited In (3)

• Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
• Hierarchy, power, and strategies to promote cooperation in social dilemmas

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