Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00367.xzbMath1137.91547MaRDI QIDQ3594919

Christopher Sleet, Stefania Albanesi

Publication date: 9 August 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00367.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B70: Stochastic models in economics

91B64: Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation)

91B62: Economic growth models

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