On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games

DOI10.1007/11496915_13zbMath1119.91302MaRDI QIDQ3596363

Nicolás E. Stier-Moses, José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz

Publication date: 30 August 2007

Published in: Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/11496915_13

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

90B20: Traffic problems in operations research

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