On Pareto-efficient contract with double moral hazard in supply chain
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3609923
Recommendations
- Buy-back contracts coordination in supply chains with bilateral moral hazard based on CVaR
- Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
- Supply chain quality control strategy under the condition of moral hazard
- Pareto-optimal contracts for a supply chain with satisficing objectives
- Incentive contract in supply chain with asymmetric information
Cited in
(7)- Supply chain quality control strategy under the condition of moral hazard
- Incentive contracts of knowledge investment for cooperative innovation in project-based supply chain with double moral hazard
- Bargaining power choices with moral hazard in a supply chain
- Pareto-optimal contracts for a supply chain with satisficing objectives
- Pareto analysis of supply chain contracts under satisficing objectives
- Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain
- Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
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