On Pareto-efficient contract with double moral hazard in supply chain
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3609923
zbMATH Open1174.91545MaRDI QIDQ3609923FDOQ3609923
Authors: Bo Zhang, Peiqing Huang 
Publication date: 6 March 2009
Recommendations
- Buy-back contracts coordination in supply chains with bilateral moral hazard based on CVaR
- Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
- Supply chain quality control strategy under the condition of moral hazard
- Pareto-optimal contracts for a supply chain with satisficing objectives
- Incentive contract in supply chain with asymmetric information
Cited In (7)
- Bargaining power choices with moral hazard in a supply chain
- Pareto-optimal contracts for a supply chain with satisficing objectives
- Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
- Supply chain quality control strategy under the condition of moral hazard
- Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain
- Incentive contracts of knowledge investment for cooperative innovation in project-based supply chain with double moral hazard
- Pareto analysis of supply chain contracts under satisficing objectives
This page was built for publication: On Pareto-efficient contract with double moral hazard in supply chain
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3609923)
