Security-Amplifying Combiners for Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
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Publication:3612552
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-74143-5_13zbMATH Open1215.94045OpenAlexW1571303828MaRDI QIDQ3612552FDOQ3612552
Authors: Anja Lehmann, Marc Fischlin 
Publication date: 10 March 2009
Published in: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2007 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74143-5_13
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- On the Strength of the Concatenated Hash Combiner When All the Hash Functions Are Weak
- Compression from Collisions, or Why CRHF Combiners Have a Long Output
- Random oracle combiners: breaking the concatenation barrier for collision-resistance
- A Modular Design for Hash Functions: Towards Making the Mix-Compress-Mix Approach Practical
- Increasing the security of hash functions
- Constructing Secure Hash Functions by Enhancing Merkle-Damgård Construction
- More Efficient Privacy Amplification With Less Random Seeds via Dual Universal Hash Function
- Non-trivial Black-Box Combiners for Collision-Resistant Hash-Functions Don’t Exist
- On the Impossibility of Efficiently Combining Collision Resistant Hash Functions
- Amplifying Collision Resistance: A Complexity-Theoretic Treatment
- Robust multi-property combiners for hash functions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Combiners for functional encryption, unconditionally
- Obfuscation combiners
- Hash-Function Based PRFs: AMAC and Its Multi-User Security
- The sum can be weaker than each part
- Generic attacks on hash combiners
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