On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with Fair Cost Allocations

DOI10.1007/11786986_53zbMath1223.91014MaRDI QIDQ3613794

Haim Kaplan, Meital Levy, Svetlana Olonetsky, Ronen Shabo, Amos Fiat

Publication date: 12 March 2009

Published in: Automata, Languages and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/11786986_53

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

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