Securing RSA against Fault Analysis by Double Addition Chain Exponentiation

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-00862-7_31zbMath1237.94091OpenAlexW2099629555MaRDI QIDQ3623066

Matthieu Rivain

Publication date: 29 April 2009

Published in: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2009 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00862-7_31

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items

Combined Attack on CRT-RSA, On the Use of RSA Public Exponent to Improve Implementation Efficiency and Side-Channel Resistance, RSA cryptosystem with fuzzy set theory for encryption and decryption

Cites Work

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• A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
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• The Doubling Attack – Why Upwards Is Better than Downwards
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