Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3627285
DOI10.3982/ECTA7168zbMath1160.91343MaRDI QIDQ3627285
Rudolf Müller, Birgit Heydenreich, Marc Uetz, Rakesh V. Vohra
Publication date: 18 May 2009
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A43: Games involving graphs
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions, Detecting profitable deviations, Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces, Incentive compatible market design with applications, Local incentive compatibility with transfers, Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization, Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences, Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms, Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings, Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains, On the fastest Vickrey algorithm, On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem, On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms, Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles, Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer, The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness, On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle, Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case, Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games, Implementability with contingent contracts, Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains, Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments, Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences, Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments, Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods, First-best collusion without communication, Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations, General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis, Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments, Efficiency and Budget Balance
