On the Security of Padding-Based Encryption Schemes – or – Why We Cannot Prove OAEP Secure in the Standard Model
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3627447
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_23zbMath1239.94054WikidataQ59163724 ScholiaQ59163724MaRDI QIDQ3627447
Krzysztof Pietrzak, Eike Kiltz
Publication date: 12 May 2009
Published in: Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2009 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_23
94A60: Cryptography
Related Items
Toward RSA-OAEP Without Random Oracles, Instantiability of classical random-oracle-model encryption transforms, Non-adaptive programmability of random oracle, Authenticated confidential channel establishment and the security of TLS-DHE, Instantiability of RSA-OAEP under chosen-plaintext attack, A Unified Approach to Idealized Model Separations via Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A simpler construction of CCA2-secure public-key encryption under general assumptions
- OAEP reconsidered
- RSA-OAEP is secure under the RSA assumption
- The random oracle methodology, revisited
- Bounded CCA2-Secure Encryption
- Optimal Asymmetric Encryption and Signature Paddings
- Towards a Separation of Semantic and CCA Security for Public Key Encryption
- Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead
- Chosen-Ciphertext Security via Correlated Products
- Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2004
- Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
- Analysis of Random Oracle Instantiation Scenarios for OAEP and Other Practical Schemes
- On the Generic Insecurity of the Full Domain Hash
- On the Security of OAEP
- Trading One-Wayness Against Chosen-Ciphertext Security in Factoring-Based Encryption
- OAEP 3-Round:A Generic and Secure Asymmetric Encryption Padding
- Theory of Cryptography
- Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2003
