Publication:3634878
From MaRDI portal
zbMath1173.91007MaRDI QIDQ3634878
Federico Valenciano, Annick Laruelle
Publication date: 3 July 2009
game theory; expected utility; ``take-it-or-leave-it committees; application to EU; bargaining committees
91B06: Decision theory
91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
91B12: Voting theory
91B10: Group preferences
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