DEFINING KNOWLEDGE IN TERMS OF BELIEF: THE MODAL LOGIC PERSPECTIVE
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Publication:3644801
DOI10.1017/S1755020309990141zbMath1186.03030MaRDI QIDQ3644801
Joseph Y. Halpern, Ella Segev, Dov Samet
Publication date: 12 November 2009
Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
epistemic logicdoxastic logiclogic of justificationdefinability in modal logicdefinability of belief in terms of knowledgedefinability of knowledge in terms of belief
Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
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