On the power of two-party quantum cryptography

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Publication:3650686

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_5zbMATH Open1267.81129arXiv0902.4036OpenAlexW1929070925MaRDI QIDQ3650686FDOQ3650686


Authors: Louis Salvail, Christian Schaffner, Miroslava Sotáková Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 15 December 2009

Published in: Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2009 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the sole assumption of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes - we show that every protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive necessarily leaks information to a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage is a good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a different measurement at the end of the protocol. As concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.4036




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