Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
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Publication:3664773
DOI10.2307/1911413zbMath0516.90010MaRDI QIDQ3664773
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911413
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