Two-person zero-sum stochastic games with semicontinuous payoff

DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0054-7zbMath1273.91050OpenAlexW2261378892MaRDI QIDQ367428

William D. Sudderth, A. P. Maitra, Rida Laraki

Publication date: 16 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0054-7

zbMATH Keywords

Borel setsstochastic gamessubgame perfect optimal strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (5)

Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state ⋮ On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium in two-player stochastic games with shift-invariant payoffs ⋮ Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels ⋮ Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit

Cites Work

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• Semicontinuous nonstationary stochastic games. II
• Semicontinuous nonstationary stochastic games
• Lower semicontinuous stochastic games with imperfect information
• Borel stay-in-a-set games
• Domination by Borel stopping times and some separation properties
• An Approximation Theorem for Infinite Games
• Approximation Theorems for Zero-Sum Nonstationary Stochastic Games
• Subgame-Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games
• Minimax Theorems

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