Evolutionary stability in first price auctions
DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0034-3zbMATH Open1277.91031OpenAlexW2041926109MaRDI QIDQ367477FDOQ367477
Publication date: 16 September 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2316471
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simulationsevolutionary dynamicsreplicator dynamicBrown-von Neumann-Nash dynamiccontinuous strategiesfirst price auction
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cited In (7)
- Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
- Conditions for Cooperation and Trading in Value-Cost Dynamic Games
- On the dynamic stability of a price dispersion model using gradient dynamics
- Simulating auctions
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
- Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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