Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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Publication:3683835
DOI10.2307/1911240zbMath0567.90011OpenAlexW2043749813MaRDI QIDQ3683835
Richard P. McLean, Jacques Crémer
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a4d4f21d093fc7be3741e518e782601952ed1f8b
asymmetric informationoptimal selling strategiesoptimal auction designex post Nash equilibriumoptimal design of resource allocation mechanisms
Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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