An alternative characterization of top trading cycles

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0713-3zbMath1281.91125OpenAlexW1968440555WikidataQ57425949 ScholiaQ57425949MaRDI QIDQ372362

Thayer Morrill

Publication date: 7 October 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0713-3

zbMATH Keywords

assignmentschool choicepriority ruleindependence of irrelevant rankingsweak Maskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Trade models (91B60) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (18)

Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism ⋮ Competitive equilibria in school assignment ⋮ New axioms for deferred acceptance ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ Two simple variations of top trading cycles ⋮ New axioms for immediate acceptance ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Making just school assignments ⋮ Matching with restricted trade ⋮ The modified Boston mechanism

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• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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