Repeated Moral Hazard
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3734118
DOI10.2307/1911724zbMath0598.90004WikidataQ55892304 ScholiaQ55892304MaRDI QIDQ3734118
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7cb2d349acd1182a9be186e337179742cbb271f9
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91B10: Group preferences
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