Nash implementation of the Lindahl performance in economies with just two consumers: an impossibility result

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90003-5zbMATH Open1273.91311OpenAlexW1557513318MaRDI QIDQ373797FDOQ373797

Authors: Fernando Vega-Redondo 

Publication date: 25 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90003-5

Recommendations

• Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
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• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Nash implementation in pure public good economies
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (1)

• Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies

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