Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90166-1zbMATH Open1273.91218OpenAlexW2059489166MaRDI QIDQ375098FDOQ375098

Authors: Tom Lee 

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90166-1

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions

Cited In (17)

• Effects of competition in first-price auctions
• Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
• Competition May reduce the revenue in a first price auction with affiliated private values
• Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
• Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
• Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions
• Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information
• Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• Quantifying and mitigating inefficiency in information acquisition under competition
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
• Speculation in procurement auctions
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• Information Acquisition in Auctions

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