Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
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Publication:3779957
DOI10.2307/2297489zbMath0638.90014OpenAlexW2066630787MaRDI QIDQ3779957
Charles D. Kolstad, Lars Mathiesen
Publication date: 1987
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/48611
fixed point index theorydifferential topologyJacobian of marginal profitsuniqueness of homogeneous product Cournot equilibria
Fixed-point theorems on manifolds (58C30) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Fixed points and coincidences in algebraic topology (55M20)
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