Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3795449
DOI10.2307/2297403zbMath0649.90024MaRDI QIDQ3795449
Publication date: 1988
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63320
long-term relationship; seller; buyer; hidden-information principal-agent models; optimal long- term contract; renegotiation game
Related Items
Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions, Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions, Flexible versus committed and specific versus uniform: wholesale price contracting in a supply chain with downstream process innovation, Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values, The market for conservation and other hostages, An infinitely repeated rental model with incomplete information, Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade, Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart, Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency, Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation, Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design, Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships, Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting, Price experimentation with strategic buyers, Multitrade bargaining, Starting small and renegotiation, Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case, Dynamic price discrimination with customer recognition, Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information, Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller, Reserve prices in repeated auctions, Selling or leasing? Dynamic pricing of software with upgrades, Renegotiation design with multiple regulators, Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause, Screening by mode of trade, Optimal regulation of energy network expansion when costs are stochastic, Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales, Endogenous and exogenous commitment, The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation, Price discrimination based on buyers' purchase history, Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation, Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication, Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing, Dynamic yardstick mechanisms, Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu, Repeated contracting without commitment, Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
