Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets

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Publication:3804410


DOI10.2307/1912702zbMath0656.90014MaRDI QIDQ3804410

Xavier Vives

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/af9da007a88e73a498f279559a647d44e992fb29


91B60: Trade models


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