Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity

DOI10.2307/2526734zbMath0659.90017OpenAlexW1495433681MaRDI QIDQ3809545

Martin J. Osborne, Carolyn Pitchik

Publication date: 1987

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526734

zbMATH Keywords

market structurenegotiationNash bargainingmonopolyexcess capacitytwo-stage gamescredible threatsoutput quotatwo-stage model of cartels

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly ⋮ Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames ⋮ Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look

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