Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
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Publication:3809545
DOI10.2307/2526734zbMath0659.90017MaRDI QIDQ3809545
Martin J. Osborne, Carolyn Pitchik
Publication date: 1987
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526734
market structure; negotiation; Nash bargaining; monopoly; excess capacity; two-stage games; credible threats; output quota; two-stage model of cartels
91A12: Cooperative games
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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