Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
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Publication:3809545
DOI10.2307/2526734zbMath0659.90017OpenAlexW1495433681MaRDI QIDQ3809545
Martin J. Osborne, Carolyn Pitchik
Publication date: 1987
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526734
market structurenegotiationNash bargainingmonopolyexcess capacitytwo-stage gamescredible threatsoutput quotatwo-stage model of cartels
Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly ⋮ Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames ⋮ Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look
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