The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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Publication:3815875
DOI10.1287/moor.13.4.619zbMath0664.90075MaRDI QIDQ3815875
No author found.
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6a769ab83567767d2eb2f3fd0118ed9cc0aa02e
90C27: Combinatorial optimization
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
05C70: Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.)
91B08: Individual preferences
06B99: Lattices
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