Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general \(n\)-player games and its implications
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Publication:383317
DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2012.11.004zbMath1275.92079WikidataQ51296380 ScholiaQ51296380MaRDI QIDQ383317
Publication date: 25 November 2013
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2012.11.004
evolutionary game theory; Hamilton's rule; finite populations; \(n\)-player games; inclusive fitness theory; spite effect
92D15: Problems related to evolution
91A80: Applications of game theory
91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)
92D25: Population dynamics (general)
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