A tight characterization of strategic games with a unique equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2013.02.008MaRDI QIDQ385055zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antoniy Ganchev, Lata Narayanan, Sunil Shende

Publication date 29 November 2013

Published in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2013.02.008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network protocols (68M12) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• Games to induce specified equilibria
• Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case
• Topological Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium for Selfish Routing with Atomic Users

Cited in

(4)

• Games to induce specified equilibria
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748675 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784408 (Why is no real title available?)
• Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games

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