Variable-population voting rules

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.02.001MaRDI QIDQ386060zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marcus Pivato

Publication date 13 December 2013

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31896/1/MPRA_paper_31896.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

ordered abelian groupreinforcementscoring rulevoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Introduction to the theory of voting
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom

Cites work

• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• A general scoring rule
• A Note on Preference Aggregation
• A simple characterization of approval voting
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• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Consistency of decision processes
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
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• On the Extension of the Partial Order of Groups
• Ordered Vector Spaces
• Relative Utilitarianism
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
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• Voting rules as statistical estimators

Cited in

(14)

• Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
• The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
• Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
• Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
• Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
• Qualified voting systems
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
• Generalized ultraproduct and Kirman-Sondermann correspondence for vote abstention
• Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
• Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal
• Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
• Extensive measurement in social choice
• A generalization to networks of Young's characterization of the Borda rule
• An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach

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