On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
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(38)- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Truthful revelation of preferences for a public good
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
- Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- A simple budget-balanced mechanism
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
- Service capacity decision and incentive compatible cost allocation for reporting usage forecasts
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Balanced ranking mechanisms
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
- A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- House allocation with transfers
- Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
- Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
- An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
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