A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
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Publication:3892023
DOI10.2307/1911126zbMath0446.90009OpenAlexW2007488710MaRDI QIDQ3892023
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911126
Pareto optimalitypublic goodscompetitive equilibriaLindahl equilibriaattaining Lindahl allocationsgovernmental decision makingsimple incentive compatible scheme
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