Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs
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Publication:3912310
DOI10.2307/1912748zbMath0462.90010MaRDI QIDQ3912310
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912748
Nash equilibrium; competitive equilibrium; free entry; monopoly power; industrial organization of markets; large fixed costs
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