Core Theory with Strongly Convex Preferences

DOI10.2307/1911411MaRDI QIDQ3916331zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert M. Anderson

Publication date 1981

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0578.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

sequences of economiesuniform convexity condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited in

(14)

• Walras degrees and probability of a blocking coalition at Pareto allocations
• A Nonstandard Approach to Option Pricing
• Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions
• Core convergence without monotone preferences and free disposal
• On the effective content of asymptotic verifications of Edgeworth's Conjecture
• STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
• Gap-minimizing prices and quadratic core convergence
• A uniform core convergence result for non-convex economies
• Market games and Walrasian equilibria
• On a reformulation of Cournot-Nash equilibria
• Walrasian analysis via two-player games
• The coalitional approach to core theory
• On the independence of core-equivalence results from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
• Core allocations and small income transfers

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