Core Theory with Strongly Convex Preferences
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Publication:3916331
DOI10.2307/1911411zbMATH Open0464.90005OpenAlexW2179315586MaRDI QIDQ3916331FDOQ3916331
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0578.pdf
Cited In (14)
- The coalitional approach to core theory
- A Nonstandard Approach to Option Pricing
- Core allocations and small income transfers
- Core convergence without monotone preferences and free disposal
- A uniform core convergence result for non-convex economies
- Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions
- On the effective content of asymptotic verifications of Edgeworth's Conjecture
- On the independence of core-equivalence results from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
- Walras degrees and probability of a blocking coalition at Pareto allocations
- On a reformulation of Cournot-Nash equilibria
- Walrasian analysis via two-player games
- STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
- Gap-minimizing prices and quadratic core convergence
- Market games and Walrasian equilibria
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