Imperfect Competition in the International Energy Market: A Computerized Nash-Cournot Model

DOI10.1287/opre.30.2.252zbMath0481.90009OpenAlexW2567818190MaRDI QIDQ3939550

Stephen W. Salant

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12021/1/MPRA_paper_12021.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

oligopolyopen-loop Nash equilibriummultistage noncooperative gamecomputerized Nash-Cournot modelinternational energy marketmaximization of discounted profit resource constraintspolitical constraintstechnical constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (6)

Convergence analysis and algorithmic implications of two dynamic processes toward an oligopoly-competitive fringe equilibrium solution ⋮ Differentiated oligopolistic markets with concave cost functions via Ky Fan inequalities ⋮ Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model ⋮ Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey ⋮ Solving stochastic complementarity problems in energy market modeling using scenario reduction ⋮ A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium

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