Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation

DOI10.1287/mnsc.28.6.604zbMath0482.90037MaRDI QIDQ3941166

Artur Raviv, Milton Harris, Charles H. Kriebel

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.28.6.604

zbMATH Keywords

transfer pricing; asymmetric information; theory of the firm; incentives; organization design; optimal resource allocation; intrafirm resource allocation; division managers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90B30: Production models

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

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