Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
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Publication:3951865
DOI10.2307/2526438zbMath0489.90011MaRDI QIDQ3951865
Publication date: 1982
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526438
simple majority rule; expert rule; weighted majority rule; classical uncertain dichotomous choice; neutral rule; optimal decision making procedure
91B06: Decision theory
90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives
91B14: Social choice
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