Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
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Publication:3983468
DOI10.2307/2297941zbMath0743.90033MaRDI QIDQ3983468
Robert M. Townsend, Christopher Phelan
Publication date: 27 June 1992
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7f579eef3cdb59911b668bc73ec110ab2d4f92de
91B62: Economic growth models
90-08: Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming
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